Reparations are often seen as victim-centred measures to address past atrocities, but how far in the past should such remedies stretch? This question is perhaps most pronounced with the transatlantic slave trade, which is now accepted as a horrendous atrocity, but at the time was legal and victims were not redressed. Although reparations have a strong basis in international law since the Second World War, governments often adopt such measures through political settlements to draw a line under the past and provide new opportunities for victims. Reparations, at least in the legal arena, can embody a contention between societal feasibility and individual and/or group rights to a remedy for harm caused to them. Yet the extent to which legal and political measures of reparations can address the past is strained, due to the size of the victim population and how long ago historic violations were This article takes a socio-legal approach drawing from human rights law, victimology, private law and transitional justice to examine the case of claim reparations for historic violations. It argues that while a collective approach to reparations as promoted by CARICOM is likely to be more palatable for responsible states, and more workable in legal terms, there remain serious legal challenges in finding sufficient evidence of a causal nexus between contemporary suffering and historical wrongs to satisfy judicial requirements. Paired with the difficulty of establishing that the wrongdoing was prohibited in law at the time the acts were committed, this leads away from the conclusion that a legal claim would be successful. However, in political terms specific evidentiary requirements and the distinction between law and morality can be more flexible, allowing claims which might not succeed on the basis of legal doctrine to conclude on the basis of justice. The CARICOM claim targets the modalities of reparations to respond to the contemporary consequences of transatlantic enslavement. A political settlement drawing from the experience of transitional justice is therefore likely to be more appropriate in providing redress. As such, this article critically assesses the CARICOM claim for reparations, and suggests appropriate measures if political reparations were to be made.
While the claim for reparations at Durban was strongly rejected by Western states, it continues to be pursued by Caribbean nations through CARICOM, aiming to tackle the contemporary consequences of historical abuse committed against their ancestors during the transatlantic slave trade.
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This article takes a socio-legal approach drawing from human rights law, victimology, private law and transitional justice to examine the case of claim reparations for historic violations. It argues that while a collective approach to reparations as promoted by CARICOM is likely to be more palatable for responsible states, and more workable in legal terms, there remain serious legal challenges in finding sufficient evidence of a causal nexus between contemporary suffering and historical wrongs to satisfy judicial requirements. Paired with the difficulty of establishing that the wrongdoing was prohibited in law at the time the acts were committed, this leads away from the conclusion that a legal claim would be successful. However, in political terms specific evidentiary requirements and the distinction between law and morality can be more flexible, allowing claims which might not succeed on the basis of legal doctrine to conclude on the basis of justice. The CARICOM claim targets the modalities of reparations to respond to the contemporary consequences of transatlantic enslavement. A political settlement drawing from the experience of transitional justice is therefore likely to be more appropriate in providing redress. As such, this article critically assesses the CARICOM claim for reparations, and suggests appropriate measures if political reparations were to be made.
We explore these issues in four parts. First we examine reparations as justice and their construction in international law, discussing growing victimological understanding of redress for international crimes. In the second part we identify the continuing limitations of reparations being claimed under current legal regimes whether domestic or international. We broaden this examination by considering reparations as a political project in the third part, discussing other political settlements made for historical atrocities. In the final part we reflect on the possibilities of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement before concluding. While we argue that the possibility for reparations for the transatlantic slave trade on a legal basis is unlikely, we do believe that in setting aside the legal lens on dealing with historic atrocities, there can be a larger space for states involved in the transatlantic slave trade on a moral and political basis to recognise the harm caused and make symbolic reparations. Of course this does not have the same force or binding as law, it would allow acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of the trade and greater focus in addressing the long term consequences of the transatlantic slave trade. 
REPARATIONS AS JUSTICE
Reparations are premised on the attempt to redress wrongful acts. Rather than seeking distributive justice or absolute equality, legal reparations focus on providing a remedy for specific acts of wrongdoing with identifiable victims and perpetrators. Reparations in this legal context, serve a tripartite function in satisfying the demands of justice by: vindicating the law; placing obligations to repair on the shoulders of responsible actors; and providing for the needs of the victims by redressing their suffering and manifesting their right to a remedy for breaches of their rights. Justice demands that breaches of law be met with an appropriate remedy, and reparations as a justice mechanism are a means by which this can be comprehensively granted. Reparations, extending beyond mere compensation, are constituted of three key elements: acknowledgement; responsibility; and remedy. 6 They therefore reflect the totality of situations of wrongdoing and victimisation, rather than simply addressing the consequences.
Within a rectificatory framework, justice requires the return of the victim and the perpetrator to equality by removing any unlawful gain from the perpetrator and returning it to the victim, a sort of transactional arrangement. reparations must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed. 8 However, when dealing with massive, widespread, or severe abuses, the principle of restitutio in integrum becomes increasingly unfeasible. It is impossible to return victims to the positions that they would have been in but for the wrongdoing. As Minow identifies, 'no market measures exist for the value of living an ordinary life, without nightmares or survivor guilt'.
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At best reparations can never completely 'efface' the harm caused, but they can at least alleviate continuing suffering and loss, In relation to enslavement, it would be inappropriate to base reparations on the notion of return to the status quo ante, as redress to those who directly suffered would be 'impossible, insufficient, and inadequate'. 13 Moreover, returning the individual to their personal and property rights before the violation would neglect the more structural causes of victimisation, marginalisation and discrimination. 14 Nevertheless, reparations based on dealing with the continuing harms and recognition of the moral wrongdoings perpetrated may still be appropriate.
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The intergenerational nature of claims relating to historical injustices erodes the basis of reparations claims. Identifying a causal nexus between the continuing suffering of contemporary descendants and the original wrongdoing becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. In the case of racialised transatlantic enslavement, intervening factors also contribute to the harms experienced by descendants -apartheid, colonialism, black codes, segregation, international debts and other discriminatory practices all contribute to current suffering in a way that at least obscures, and at most completely overrides, the historically based claims. Judicial practice tends to recognise the claims of direct victims and their immediate family (children, spouses, parents and sometimes siblings), but rarely strays beyond these limits on claimants. 16 Hill argues that compensatory justice seems inappropriate past one generation, the passage of time mitigates the physical harm or is accommodated, but there may still be grounds for claiming restitution of property or unjust enrichment for the non-payment of labours of ancestors.
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This approach denies the broader impact of injustices on families and communities, acknowledging only the harms to the direct victims, and perhaps their next-of-kin.
While individual physical harm may be accommodated within a generation, systematic and structural abuses that continue to harm subsequent generations do not necessarily naturally change over time, and may reinforce disenfranchisement and discriminatory practices towards such groups and communities. An increasing body of psychological research supports the transgenerational impact The increasing focus on rehabilitation and the medicalisation of victims' harm, may recast victims as sick, rather than wronged. Whether the law is an appropriate mechanism for redressing such harms remains debateable, as the typical focus of judicial proceedings relies on the relationship between a perpetrator or responsible actor and each victim as an individual. Arendt goes so far as to say that the scale of mass atrocities 'explode the limits of the law ', 19 and that courts and their legal principles designed to deal out ordinary justice are insufficient to grapple with such atrocities.
In attempting to make the incomprehensible justiciable, courts can serve as empowering mechanisms whereby the individual agency and rights of victims are recognised and vindicated. On the other hand, the focus on the individual's rights can undermine the gravity of the holistic experience of atrocities that target groups, communities or populations. The tendency of legal proceedings to individualise victims can ignore important elements of the suffering of the victims:
atrocities were committed on a large scale; they were targeted for some aspect of their fundamental identity; or they were denied humanity on the basis of particular, morally arbitrary characteristics.
Courts can provide victims with an official forum in which their stories are heard and recognised; the value of testimony in fostering psychological healing for victims of atrocities is significant. 20 Yet, the appropriateness of court proceedings for accomplishing such healing and redress faces a number of limitations discussed further below.
Reparations are not purely (or even necessarily primarily) concerned with practical redress, they also have an important symbolic component in that they can 'acknowledge and recognise the individual's suffering … can help concretise a traumatic event, aid an individual to come to terms with it and help label responsibility.'
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Traumatic suffering is characterised by the inability to come to terms with an experience as it occurs, reinforcing the importance of efforts aimed towards acknowledgement and memory building.
22
Reparations in this context can reflect 'social, moral, psychological and religious meanings' attached to official efforts to redress the past, such as public apologies and acknowledgement of responsibility, memorials and commemorations. Sharing the traumatic experience with others is a precondition for the restitution of a sense of a meaningful world…Restoration of the breach between the traumatized person and the community depends, first, upon public acknowledgement of the traumatic event and, second, upon some form of community action. Once it is publicly recognized that a person has been harmed, the community must take action to assign responsibility for the harm and to repair the injury. These two responses -recognition and restitution -are necessary to rebuild the survivor's sense of order and justice. This sits in stark contrast to the past where they were vilified, dehumanised and targeted. In building this new political community, social solidarity and inclusion is extended to victims as citizens entitled to a remedy. While of course there are not enough resources to fully or completely remedy victims' harm, Hamber suggests the notion of 'good enough', whereby sufficient effort and recognition is made to victims to leave them psychologically satisfied, in turn rebuilding community and societal bonds.
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As a victim-centred form of redress with both material and symbolic components, reparations are not only driven by outcomes, but also by procedural roles and the inclusivity of awards.
Procedural justice is concerned with improving victims' satisfaction with state programmes, mainly criminal justice processes, by treating them fairly, with respect and in such a way that they will perceive that their input is valued. acknowledgement of victims' 'world view' on their past victimisation, the causes that gave rise to it, and those responsible can be a way of affirming their dignity as human beings, recognising that they did not deserve to suffer such harm. Danieli goes as far to say that inclusion of victims in itself offers 'an opportunity for redress and healing '. 28 In this way, the procedures through which reparations are granted can acknowledge the importance of victims' agency and worth, and victims thereby have an important role to play in shaping appropriate reparations.
Including victims as active participants in reparations procedures is particularly important in the context of gross violations of human rights where victims are denied basic humanity through the abuses, and where impunity often attaches to wrongdoing (particularly in transitional societies and when official actors played a role in the abuses). 
THE LIMITS OF REPARATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The possibility of pursuing a case claiming reparations for the transatlantic slave trade in domestic courts is severely inhibited by the difficulties associated with mass claim actions, time limits on claims, rules on standing and separation of powers based principles, such as the political question doctrine in the United States.
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The scale and collective nature of the harms in question, on top of these impediments, make international law the only likely forum for such a reparations claim.
However, international law has many hurdles of its own. Here we identify three main obstacles in domestic and international law that will inhibit or prevent reparations claims for the transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement: non-retroactivity; causation; and attribution of responsibility.
Non-Retroactivity
By today's standards, the transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement would undoubtedly amount to a crime against humanity.
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However international law, like domestic law, enshrines the principle of non-retroactivity as a fundamental tenet of the legal system.
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The Articles on State Responsibility, for instance, guarantee protection against retrospective application of international 28 Danieli n.14, p66. In order to found a legal claim for reparations, it must therefore be established that the acts in question were contrary to international law at the time that the acts were committed. This is not supported under current conceptions of the development of the prohibition of slavery, which is generally recognised as having come into existence in 1926. 34 Although morally repugnant, slavery was legal and regulated under domestic law of the time, as well as the tentative 'international' law of the time. This of course does not prevent states from agreeing to political settlements over historic injustices, it only prevents the international legal order being used as a remedial avenue.
Causation
It is a general principle of private, criminal and international law that harm caused to a victim capable of being redressed through judicial mechanisms must be the result of a wrong or crime committed by the responsible party on trial. 42 As a legal construct, reparations do not seek to address all suffering, but rather the specific damages which result from particular wrongdoing; compensable harms are those sufficiently proximate consequences which are causally connected to the illegal acts in question. which became more difficult for more indirect victims in subsequent years. 45 For instance with subsequent claims in the 1990s against private corporations such as Swiss banks, the harm was more removed as many of the direct survivors had died, and it was their next-of-kin or heirs making claims.
Ultimately, the Swiss banks Holocaust settlement recognised that not all heirs for the purpose of personal injury claims should be eligible for compensation as it would dilute the amount of money available to those directly harmed given the limited nature of the funds. 46 Although this conclusion resulted in large part from the financial limitations of the situation, a clear distinction was drawn between direct and subsequent victims premised on the strength and proximity of the causal nexus.
This would pose even greater challenges in reparation claims for transatlantic enslavement, as these have passed through several additional generations than had the claims in the Swiss banks settlement.
Legal causation seeks to establish not only which consequences are connected to the wrongdoing, but which connected harms ought to be redressed by the wrongdoer in any given case.
Legal causation therefore requires an assessment of remoteness, foreseeability, and proximity. Every human act produces diverse consequences, some proximate and others remote. An old adage puts it as follows: causa causae est causa causati. Imagine the effect of a stone cast into a lake; it will cause concentric circles to ripple over the water, moving further and further away and becoming ever more imperceptible. Thus it is that all human actions cause remote and distant effects.
To compel the perpetrator of an illicit act to erase all the consequences produced by his action is completely impossible, since that action caused effects that multiplied to a degree that cannot be measured. 48 The law must therefore draw a distinction at some point between proximate and remote harms, in order to avoid infinitely varying and ethereal consequences coming within the purview of a specific cause of action. The principle of foreseeability is embedded in the bilateral nature of judicial proceedings: claims are not only constituted by victims, but are levied against a specific actor who is The principle of attenuation recognises that the more remote an action is from the claimed consequences, the more difficult it will be for a court to find a clear causal connection. Just as the impact of an illegal police procedure on evidence can 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint', 53 so too can the effect of wrongdoing on a victim become so far removed over time as to destroy the causal nexus.
Intervening actions and events which impact upon the victim can similarly weaken the causal chain, and such events may be so significant as to completely override the original wrongdoing as a cause of current harms. In the case of enslavement of African people and their descendants in the United States, for instance, the institution of slavery was succeeded by segregation, lynching, However, these factors may be considered to diminish the impact of original wrongdoing upon the victims, rather than completely severing the chain of causation. In such a case, the amount of reparation or damages awarded could be reduced on the principle of mitigation.
Attribution of Responsibility
A legal claim for redress, premised on the need to do justice between wrongdoers and victims, Mau case was an exception given it was a settlement. The rules were also found to be more flexible with the court stating that there exists 'the widest possible discretion, within bounds, to enable claims for personal injury to proceed outside the general limitation period where the justice of the case so requires.' 59 Establishing responsibility for companies, such as those who facilitated the transport of individuals into slavery, would be difficult in legal terms, given that many of these companies no longer exist or have changed ownership or merged with other corporations multiple times. Such basis for reparations may be on political ground given the public pressure that can be placed on slavery profiting companies, some of whom have funded scholarships to descendants of slaves. 
REPARATIONS AS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
Reparations in relation to severe, historical, and state-perpetrated injustices do not rise or fall only within the bounds of judicial systems. In such cases reparations can, and often are, constructed within the political arena where they are built as a political ' According to de Greiff reparations can serve a truth-telling function by helping to clarify the past and 'awaken empathy with victims'. 66 Hamber suggests that while reparations may not be comprehensive and full, where there is sufficient effort and recognition made to victims can be seen as 'good enough', leaving them psychologically satisfied, in turn rebuilding community and societal bonds. Third, proportionality requires that the redress granted to the victims is reflective of the harms that they suffered as a result of the breach of their rights. Human rights reparation principles support that awards should not enrich or impoverish victims, but be equal 64 Ibid., p458.
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Magarrell n.21, p91. 66 de Greiff n.59, p464. 67 Hamber n.22, p137. particular social and political contexts in a manner which legal reparations are less apt to achieve. As such, effective reparations programmes should go beyond the direct, individualised redress provided for through court processes to address the circumstances and contributory factors of historical atrocities, rather than dealing only with the specific wrong and the resulting harm.
Processes constructed on transformative justice principles are more appropriate for dealing with transatlantic chattel enslavement, as the foundational premise and justification for the so-called 'trade' was the extreme racialisation and marginalisation of particular groups of people to be exploited for profit. The reincarnation of extreme inequality between people racialised as black and white through the decades following legal abolition of slavery belies the argument that the process of 'emancipation' in itself was transformative. Individuals would still be able to benefit from reparations, in that they would respond to individual needs for rehabilitation, such as counselling, but also be aimed at redressing wider common needs of descendants of the 'transatlantic slave trade'.
REPARATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND HISTORICAL ENSLAVEMENT
When applying the rubric of reparations, it is important to ensure that the theoretical and practical The schism between historical injustices and the provision of redress through both legal and political means is apparent in the case of the Japanese-Americans interned by the US during the Second World War. Despite the fact that some of those interned were unsuccessful in bringing legal proceedings against the government in the years after the war, it was not until the late 1980s, after years of political lobbying, that the US government agreed to pay compensation to each surviving internee. 76 However, the payment itself, only $20,000 for each victim, was a symbolic gesture, a 'token' that did not correspond to the severity of individuals' suffering. were originally excluded from the scheme, only obtaining $5,000 each after successfully challenging the law through the courts. Also excluded from the process were those victims who had died before the passing of the law in 1988, narrowing the pool of victims who were awarded compensation.
Spouses, children and parents were only eligible for awards where the victim had survived up to the enactment of the legislation, but died before payment had been made. 78 The extent to which JapaneseAmerican reparations provide support for claims relating to enslavement and other abuses crossing generations is therefore limited, as reparations took place only forty-three years after the conclusion of the war and were only awarded within the lifespan of the victims.
The claim that it would be unjust to make present actors responsible for the wrongs of history holds significant sway in the public debate surrounding the issue of reparations for transatlantic enslavement. Kukathas argues that agents -victim and perpetrator -must be identifiable, and 'one generation cannot be asked to atone for the sins of earlier ones'. point that responsible states involved in the slave trade will want to make a settlement on reparations. 85 The historical documentation of the transatlantic slave trade is extensive and sufficiently maintained so as to establish the nature and extent of harms committed. Shelton's fourth factor is therefore easily satisfied in relation to the brutal trade. Although establishing legal wrongdoing may be out of reach, the moral and political claim to the severity of the injustice is compelling. Reparations may be awarded in cases where the perpetrators purported the legality of the abuses provided there is a sufficiently strong moral justification, such was the case in relation to German atrocities committed during World War II. Establishing continuing harm and a causal connection to the past injustice as required to satisfy Shelton's fifth factor may be more difficult in relation to a system abolished in the 1800s. Claims based on the collective impact of an injustice, as are advanced by CARICOM, require a sufficient causal nexus to the slave trade and Western states' involvement in such, as well as evidence of that harm having translated through the generations to contemporary institutions of racism, deprivation and discrimination.
There is increasing evidence to support the intergenerational impact of major injustices, with transgenerational harms being noted in the children and grandchildren of those who have suffered from political repression or conflict. 86 The extent to which this travels to generations beyond grandchildren to the extent that claims for transatlantic enslavement require remains unclear.
However, the effects of structural injustices can be more easily traced in such a case including the economic impact of enslavement and the systems of labour put in place in the Caribbean on the contemporary states. The CARICOM claim seeks to classify modern citizens suffering from the legacies of enslavement as such a collective. The lack of specificity in identifying individual recipients of state-based reparations poses some challenge, as the collective right to reparations (unlike the identification of harm) seems to be limited to a multiplicity of individuals in a group rather than the group itself. Acknowledgement of wrongdoing is vital to the success of a reparations programme, and meaningful apologies are an integral aspect of such recognition. Successful apologies usually include an acceptance of responsibility, sincere statements of regret, a willingness to make amends and prevent future violations without any excuses or offensive explanations. 105 A successful apology can meaningfully contribute to reconciliation and reparation, whereas unsuccessful apologies can simply add insult to injury. Insincere apologies or half-hearted acknowledgements of responsibility, for instance, in trying to close a chapter on the past might 'make survivors feel that reparations are being used to buy their silence and put a stop to their continuing quest for truth and justice.' 106 Perhaps the CARICOM claim should engage European and MENA states to engage on the reparations issues as a symbolic way to take moral responsibility, not legal, for the transatlantic slave trade and apologies that by today's standards is reprehensible and efforts will be made on developmental terms with such affected states to heal the long term consequences of the slave trade. This may have to take the form of an international treaty that bars any individual, collective or state claim against those states involved in the slave trade, in exchange for focused development or cancellation of debt and symbolic reparations.
Development funds have been part of reparations ordered by human rights courts. By way of example in the Moiwana Community v Suriname case -after armed forces of Suriname attacked the village of Moiwana, massacred over 40 people, razed the village to the ground, forced survivors to flee into exile or internal displacement, and failed to adequately investigate the massacre -the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights ordered the state to set up a development fund to provide health, housing and educational programmes for community members. 107 The development fund was to be represented by three members: one selected by the victim, one by the state, and the third agreed between the victims and the state. 108 To complement this fund the Court ordered the state to provide more symbolic measures of a public apology and acknowledgement of its responsibility, as well as to construct a memorial. 109 In other cases before the Inter-American Court, the Court has ordered extensive rehabilitative measures to communities affected by gross violations of human rights, such as housing and development programmes, healthcare centres, cultural education and infrastructure. When European governments respond, as they do, to the injustices suffered by Black people, it is by way of development aid or anti-discrimination laws, so that generous Europeans appear to be bestowing benefits on poor suffering Africans.
There is often an overtone of condescension: the Africans are suffering because their leaders have messed things up, but we still help. 112 While 'development' can be constructed and developed with input from the victims, they are framed as collective beneficiaries rather than as individuals with rights and agency. Framing measures as reparative -as connected to specific acts of wrongdoing -as well as involving affected communities in the construction of programmes can therefore be essential in countering these notions of dependency and marginalisation. Engagement with transformational reparations may be a way forward in reimagining narratives of victimisation and hundreds of years of exploitation and continuing discrimination towards inclusivity and respect of the dignity of descendants of the transatlantic slave trade and historic enslavement.
CONCLUSION
Reparations are a symbolic way of accounting for a society's past wrongdoing. No amount of money is ever going to undo the harm caused by gross violations of human rights. While today's generation and government may be decades or even centuries removed from the atrocities of enslavement, colonialism and the genocide of indigenous peoples, they nevertheless indirectly benefit from the economic development arising from the economic exploitation of labour, capital, and land.
Reparations look not only to the past, but to reaffirm the contemporary legal order and the morality of the state by recognising that such past atrocities were reprehensible. They also serve to distinguish the state from its predecessor, affirming that the society has advanced to meaningfully acknowledge the dignity and equality of all human beings. Such measures may only be symbolic, but they can provide for practical redress, affirmative action or the restitution of land to indigenous populations.
It is clear that the issue of reparations for the transatlantic slave trade is not going to go away.
CARICOM's 10-point plan focusing on symbolic redress and rebalancing of ongoing structural inequalities domestically and internationally provides a way forward for opening the discussion on redressing the transatlantic slave trade in political and moral terms. Given the number of states involved, the lack of international legal basis for claiming reparations, and the passage of time, a multinational treaty may be the best way forward, rather than pressuring each individual state responsible for the slave trade. In the face of increasing racism and xenophobia across the world, political maturity and moral leadership in Western countries in making overtures to symbolic reparations to descendants of the slave trade could go a long way in reaffirming the wrongs of the past and promoting the value these populations bring to the international community.
